President Obama has been credited with weighing issues with a cost benefit analysis and taking wise decisions. So has President Kennedy been lauded, who exercised “strategic restraint” in not using force in the Cuban missile crisis.
By Ruwantissa Abeyratne
On 8 April 2018 The New York Times reported that: “North Korea has told the United States that its leader, Kim Jong-un, is willing to discuss denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula…[T]alks between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim would represent the first direct engagement between a sitting American president and a North Korean leader, bringing together two mercurial and headstrong leaders who have lobbed long-distance insults and bellicose threats at each other.” On 12 June 2018, in a carefully choreographed event, the wo adversaries seemingly buried their acrimonious hatchet which they had wielded against each other for 70 years. On the face of it, almost everyone gave credit to both leaders of The United States and The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) for the initiative to meet each other, if only to set the stage for a “deal” on both sides that is calculated to eventually establish lasting peace between the United States, its allies and DPRK.
CNBC reported that the agreement reached between the two leaders provides: “The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity; The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA (prisoners of war/missing in action) remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified”.
As one can see, although these are general statements without details, they contain commitments to work toward identified goals. Of significance is the statement of the North Korean leader – that several obstacles had to be overcome to reach this stage – as well the statement by President Trump – that he had done what he was best at – making a deal. Whatever may be in the strategy and mind of the North Koran leader, and irrespective of the consequences of the “deal”, this article intends to discuss what President Trump may have meant by making a deal with the North Korean leader, which was seemingly calculated to enable Americans to sleep peacefully without the apprehension of a threat of attack.
The Art of the Deal
The answer, or at least part thereof, may lie in the text of President Trump’s best-selling book The Art of the Deal where he lays down several characteristics of a good deal maker, some of which are: Think Big – “I like thinking big. I always have. To me it’s very simple, if you are going to think anyway, you might as well think big.” He gives the example of President Carter, who, after he was not elected for a second term, came to President Trump (then a successful businessman) and asked for 5 million dollars for the former’s foundation. The latter was impressed that the former President “had the balls to think big”.; Maximize your options – “I also protect myself by being flexible. I never get too attached to one deal or one approach. For starters, I keep a lot of balls in the air, because most deals fall out, no matter how promising they seem at first…”; Use your leverage –The worst thing you can possibly do in a deal is to seem desperate to make it. That makes the other guy smell blood and then you are dead…”; Deliver he goods- “You can’t con people, at least not for long. You can create excitement, you can do wonderful promotion and get all kinds of press, and you can throw a little hyperbole. But if you don’t deliver the goods, people will eventually catch on”. The author relates an experience he had while a teenager in military school with a teacher – a former drill sergeant in the marines who was tough and rough – “the kind of guy who could slam into a goal post wearing a football helmet and break the post rather than his head” Knowing he could not take him on physically, the President says: “I took a third route, which was to use my head to get around the guy…I learnt how to play him. What I did was to convey that I respected his authority, but that he didn’t intimidate me”. President Trump follows his narrative in his book The Art of the Comeback saying “another element of success, which I have to mention here because it truly can’t be acquired is luck.
Micah Zenko, Whitehead Senior Fellow, US and the Americas Programme, of Chatham House says: “by any objective reading, Trump’s decision to meet Kim deserves praise…That’s so for several reasons. First, it is impossible to reach a settlement without some form of communication between two parties… all governments employ some degree of bluff or deception to mask their interests, intentions or plans. North Korea is no different in this regard, although it has been comparatively transparent about the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities…there are no adversaries so immoral or evil that they should never be engaged”.
Zenko adds: “[A]s Mitchell Reiss details in his book Negotiating with Evil, ever since George Washington, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson authorized annual payments of naval supplies to the Barbary pirates, virtually all presidents have consulted and compromised with adversaries who were — at the time — considered to be the most despicable and vile individuals imaginable…meeting with your adversaries is not a concession to them. Rather, it is an opportunity to better grasp their ideas and motivations and to explore if there is the possibility of brokering an understanding or agreement over disputed positions…you cannot control how the adversary will portray diplomacy. Many critics of Trump’s current approach to North Korea worry about what this signal meant to the international community, and most importantly, it is not the act of face-to-face negotiations that matters but the manner in which they are prepared and conducted”.
The Politics of Caution
Some have concerns, not without justification, that President Trump may have given away too much, particularly in announcing on his own initiative that the “war games” – joint military exercises between The United States and The Republic of Korea (South Korea) – will be suspended, with the explanation that they would be provocative and effectively preclude the attainment of peace in the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, President Trump alluded to the tremendous cost to the United States of the conduct of such exercises. Fareed Zakaria, CNN’s commentator in his Sunday programme GPS – The Global Public Square – said on 17 June – “The most striking elements of Trump’s initiative were not simply that he lavished praise on North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong Un, but that he announced the cancellation of military exercises with South Korea, adopting North Korea’s own rhetoric by calling them ‘provocative… the President must have missed his briefing.”
One of the main criticisms of President Trump’s approach to foreign policy has been that he wants to win, not negotiate. The Economist in its June 9th Issue stresses the point: “… Iran could resume nuclear work, as ruling clerics ape North Korea’s strategy of arming themselves before talking….it would leave Asian allies vulnerable to the North’s nukes. America first today: in the long run America Alone”.
President Obama has been credited with weighing issues with a cost benefit analysis and taking wise decisions. So has President Kennedy been lauded, who exercised “strategic restraint” in not using force in the Cuban missile crisis. President Eisenhower has been applauded for “leading from behind”. President Reagan did not heed Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s recommendations to send 25,000 troops into Central America to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining another foothold in the Northern hemisphere, and instead negotiated with Gorbachev, amidst strong objections from the CIA. President Reagan did not retaliate against the Beirut barracks bombings that killed 240 U.S. Marines, on the basis that a surge of U.S. troops in Lebanon would serve no advantage to the United States, thus avoiding bloodshed and precious lives of American soldiers.
As to whether the unprecedented move by both leaders who have been adversaries for 70 years is one of strategic restraint and a genuine attempt at solving a gnawing problem and threat to world peace is yet to be seen. There have been many views of political pundits, none of which can be discounted as nonsense in the context of this complex issue. China may be laughing in the face of the suspension of the joint military exercises in the Korean Peninsula, happy that denuclearization ultimately will remove the ominous presence of the United States in the Peninsula; Japan and South Korea may be uneasy, the latter apprehensive of a possible breakdown of its 70-year long friendship with the United States; the rest of South East Asia may not know what to think. That makes two of us.
The author is a former senior official of the United Nations.
Courtesy- slguardian.org
