Sri Lanka’s newly enacted Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Act introduces significant changes to the country’s corruption-fighting machinery. But behind the administrative improvements lie contentious questions about prosecutorial discretion, public access to asset declarations, media freedom and the rights of accused persons. The Supreme Court rejected key provisions in their original form. NEWSLINE examines what was proposed, what Parliament approved and what still requires explanation.
Sri Lanka’s Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Act, No. 25 of 2026, became law following Speaker Jagath Wickramaratne’s endorsement on October 19. Parliament had passed the legislation eleven days earlier, without a division, following amendments introduced at the committee stage. The Government describes the changes as necessary to address weaknesses in the Anti-Corruption Act of 2023 and strengthen the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC).
The amendments go considerably beyond correcting administrative shortcomings. They concern who must disclose personal wealth, who can withdraw criminal charges, how accomplices may escape prosecution in return for cooperation, what information can be withheld from public scrutiny and how courts exercise their powers over bail. These are substantive matters affecting the relationship between the State, its citizens and the institutions responsible for enforcing the law.
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One important change concerns Section 67 of the principal Act. Clause 3 of the amending Bill expands the Director-General’s authority to withdraw charges filed in Magistrates’ Courts, extending a power previously associated with High Court indictments. Although prosecutorial discretion is a recognised feature of criminal justice, its expansion makes transparent decision-making and effective safeguards particularly important.
Clause 4 addresses another significant question: the treatment of accomplices who cooperate with corruption investigations. The proposed amendment permits the Commission to authorise the Director-General not to prosecute an accomplice who makes a full and truthful disclosure of the circumstances surrounding an offence. Such arrangements can be valuable when investigating sophisticated corruption networks, but the obvious question is whether those exercising this discretion will be required to explain why one participant receives immunity while another faces prosecution.
The legislation also proposes expanding asset-declaration obligations to specified officials of trade unions with more than 1,000 registered members. At the same time, another provision raises the relevant State-shareholding threshold for certain corporate officers from 25% to 50%. These changes pull in different directions, extending scrutiny to some individuals while potentially reducing its reach over others. The Supreme Court found neither provision constitutionally objectionable in its original form, but the policy justification for the distinction deserves public examination.
More controversial was Clause 6(7), which sought to bring proprietors, chairpersons and directors of specified media and telecommunications companies within the asset-declaration framework. The Supreme Court determined that the proposal was inconsistent with constitutional protections concerning equality before the law and freedom of expression. It could not have been enacted unchanged through an ordinary parliamentary majority.
The distinction matters because media ownership transparency is a legitimate public-interest objective, particularly where businesses depend on State licences, advertising or regulatory approvals. However, compelling media proprietors and directors to disclose personal financial information also raises questions about selective scrutiny and potential interference with press freedom. The precise treatment of this provision in the final Act therefore deserves particular attention.
Clause 7 raised a different concern. It proposed repealing Section 81(e), which extends asset-declaration obligations to certain persons sharing a household with a declarant. The stated objective was to protect the privacy of individuals who might otherwise be required to disclose information despite having no meaningful financial connection to the person under scrutiny. The Supreme Court found the proposed repeal constitutionally inconsistent and directed that it be withdrawn unless Parliament proceeded under the applicable special-majority requirement.
Another provision concerns the publication of asset declarations. Clause 11 addresses the redaction of information considered private, while a committee-stage proposal concerning the use of published declarations was examined by the Supreme Court. Protecting genuinely personal information is reasonable, but restricting access to information that could expose unexplained wealth, conflicts of interest or improper enrichment would raise a different question altogether. The public must be able to distinguish legitimate privacy protections from restrictions that undermine the purpose of financial disclosure.
Perhaps the most serious constitutional controversy surrounded Clause 17. The original proposal would have restricted bail in specified bribery and corruption cases involving alleged bribes of at least Rs. 100,000 or certain alleged losses or benefits of at least Rs. 500,000. Suspects falling within those thresholds would have been required to seek bail from the High Court and demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
The Supreme Court determined that the original provision was inconsistent with constitutional principles concerning sovereignty and judicial power. It could become law in that form only through a two-thirds parliamentary majority followed by approval at a referendum. The Government indicated that it would not pursue a referendum, and Parliament subsequently passed the Bill with amendments said to comply with the Court’s determination.
That leaves an important question concerning the precise wording ultimately adopted. Parliament has confirmed that amendments were introduced, but the published account of its proceedings does not provide a comprehensive clause-by-clause comparison between the original Bill and the legislation finally enacted. The distinction is not academic. It determines whether the powers initially sought by the Government were abandoned, modified or replaced with different legal mechanisms.
There is no reason to oppose legislation merely because it gives investigators stronger powers to pursue corruption. Sri Lanka has suffered enough from financial misconduct, abuse of office and the apparent inability of successive administrations to hold powerful individuals accountable. Yet stronger powers require stronger safeguards, particularly when decisions concerning prosecution, financial disclosure and personal liberty are placed in the hands of public authorities.
President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s administration has made combating corruption central to its political identity. Be that as it may, the Government’s commitment to transparency should extend to the legislation through which it intends to deliver that promise. Publishing the final amendments alongside the original proposals and the Supreme Court’s determination would provide a straightforward demonstration of that commitment.
The public should not have to reconstruct the legislative history of an anti-corruption law to discover precisely what Parliament approved. The Government has secured the legislation it wanted, subject to changes made during the parliamentary process. It must now demonstrate that the resulting law strengthens accountability without diminishing constitutional protections or shielding those entrusted with public power.
The ultimate test will not be how many new powers CIABOC receives, but whether those powers are exercised fairly, transparently and without fear or favour.
